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No, It Is Not a Christian Nation, and It
Never Has Been and Should Not Be
One
Erwin Chemerinsky*
INTRODUCTION

This Symposium asks the question “Is the United States a
Christian nation?” The answer must be a resounding no. The
country is not now, never has been, and never should be a Christian
nation as a matter of law.
In 1791, in the Treaty of Tripoli, the United States declared,
“[t]he government of the United States is not in any sense founded
on the Christian religion.”1 Proposals have been made to amend
the United States Constitution to make it a Christian nation, but
never have these attracted sufficient support to be seriously
considered. In 1864, the National Reform Association proposed
amending the Constitution: “humbly acknowledging Almighty God
as the source of all authority and power in civil government, the
Lord Jesus Christ as the ruler among nations, and his revealed will
as the supreme law of the land, in order to constitute a Christian
government.”2 In 1950, there was a proposed constitutional
* Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University
of California, Berkeley School of Law. Many of the ideas in this essay are
drawn from my recent book, co-authored with Howard Gillman, THE RELIGION
CLAUSES: THE CASE FOR SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE (2020).
1. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of America
and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, art. 11, U.S.-Tripoli, Jan. 3,
1797, 8 Stat. 154.
2. Amending the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 1864), https://www.nytimes.com/1864/02/02/archives/amending-the-constitution.html
[perma.cc/XM92-JEM3].
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amendment that would have said that the Constitution “devoutly
recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ, saviour [sic] and
ruler of nations, through whom we are bestowed the blessings of
liberty.”3 The absence of significant support for these proposed
constitutional amendments is revealing that there are some, but a
minority, who see it as desirable to make the United States legally
a Christian nation.
The language of the United States being a Christian nation has
its strongest support from a unanimous Supreme Court opinion, in
1892, where Justice David Brewer, writing for a unanimous Court,
declared that “this is a Christian nation.”4 Justice Brewer’s opinion
relied on his view of history and on one provision of the
Constitution: Article 1, Section 7, which eliminates Sundays from
the ten-day period provided for the President to consider a bill
before signing it or returning it to Congress with his veto.5 This
seeming recognition of a religious practice, Sunday worship, into
the Constitution led Justice Brewer to conclude that America was
a Christian nation.
Thankfully, this language from Justice Brewer’s opinion has
faded into obscurity and has even been expressly rejected by
subsequent justices.6 To be sure, the theme of the United States
being a Christian country continues to be expressed, especially by
the religious right. James Dobson, head of Focus on the Family,
declared: “The United States was established as a Christian nation
by Christian people.”7 But there is no indication that even the most

3. Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Recognizing the Authority and Law of Jesus Christ: Hearing on S. J. Res. 87 Before
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 63 (1954). The full proposed amendment read, “[t]his nation devoutly recognizes the authority and law of Jesus
Christ, saviour [sic] and ruler of nations, through whom are bestowed the
blessings of Almighty God.” Id.
4. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
5. Id. at 470 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 7).
6. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(calling Church of the Holy Trinity an “aberration[ ]” (citing Church of the Holy
Trinity, 465 U.S. at 471)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717–18 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling Justice Brewer’s declaration “arrogant” (citing Church of the Holy Trinity, 465 U.S. at 471)).
7. James Dobson, America is a Christian Nation, DR. JAMES DOBSON (July
14, 2017), https://www.drjamesdobson.org/broadcasts/america-christian-nation [perma.cc/S6DZ-XCFS].
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conservative, originalist justices on the Supreme Court accept this
characterization as a matter of constitutional law.
My thesis is that the United States is not a Christian nation as
a matter of law and should never be considered one. The laws of
the country cannot embody Christianity or favor it over other
religions. It is firmly established that the government violates the
Establishment Clause if it discriminates among religious groups.
Such discrimination will be allowed only if strict scrutiny is met.8
All of the Justices on the current Court, regardless of their theory
of the establishment clause, adhere to this principle. In Larson v.
Valente, the Court declared that “the history and logic of the
Establishment Clause [mean] that no State can ‘pass laws which
aid one religion’ or that ‘prefer one religion over another.’”9
But as a matter of social reality, it cannot be ignored that this
is a country where over 200 million people identify as Christians.
As a Jew, I often have the sense—especially during the December
holiday season—that I am living in a Christian nation. But as a
matter of law, including constitutional law, the United States is a
secular nation, not a Christian one. This is crucial in a country with
enormous religious pluralism, and many who profess no religious
beliefs at all.
In this Article, I make three points. First, historically, the
United States was not meant to be a Christian nation. Second, as
a matter of constitutional interpretation, the First Amendment
should be interpreted to require a separation of church and state
that would be incompatible with the United States being a
Christian nation. And finally, I fear that we have a majority of
justices on the Supreme Court who reject the idea of separating
church and state. I do not believe that they will declare the United
States officially to be a Christian nation, but I am afraid that is the
lens through which they will decide cases.

8. Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection
Clause 99–100 (Nw. U. Sch. of L., Faculty Working Paper No. 213, 2012).
9. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
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HISTORY DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLAIM OF THE UNITED STATES
BEING A CHRISTIAN NATION

I am not an originalist.10 I believe that the Constitution is a
living document that must be interpreted in light of history and
modern needs. But for those who are originalists, including
Supreme Court justices, the evidence is overwhelming that the
Constitution was not meant to create a Christian nation.
The framers of the Constitution were deeply aware of the
religious strife in other countries, including England, over a long
period of time. They very much wanted to avoid the conflict that
inevitably comes with the government being aligned with a
particular religion.11 Also, they saw themselves as part of the
enlightenment where reason had replaced religion as the basis for
decisions.12
They expressly rejected government-established
religions and forced conformity.13 They chose, and ultimately wrote
into the Constitution, the secularization of government and a
commitment to religious tolerance.14 Those who framed the
American Constitution insisted that the welfare of the people was
best advanced, not by religious establishments and forced
conformity to officially endorsed religions, but by the secularization
of government authority and the toleration of diverse religious
practitioners.15
Quite importantly, there were no references in the Constitution
to a Supreme Being, no authority given to Congress to legislate on
matters of religion, and a prohibition against religious tests for

10. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF
CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 34–46 (2018); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Philosophy That Makes Amy Coney Barrett So Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/opinion/supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett.html [perma.cc/3FYA-5C8V].
11. See JAMES T. HUTSON, RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 59 (1998).
12. See Derek H. Davis, Original Intent, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYC. (2009),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/823/original-intent
[perma.cc/VWG8-XTAW] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
13. See id.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; Id. c. 2.
15. See Saul K. Padover, The World of the Founding Fathers, 25 SOC. RES.
191, 211–14 (1958).
THE
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office.16 At the state level, at the time of the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution, there still were vestiges of formal,
government-authorized “established” religions, but state practices
were quickly changing.17 An establishment of religion (in terms of
direct tax aid for a favored church) was the practice in nine of the
thirteen British colonies on the eve of the American Revolution, but
by 1800 only three American states (New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut) had established churches.18
These all faded relatively quickly in the early nineteenth century.19
Some of the arguments associated with this transformation—
especially during Virginia’s multi-year debate about assessments in
support of particular churches—became among the most important
and revered documents in all of American history.20 They certainly
are regarded as foundational in understanding what the framers
intended with the religion clauses in the First Amendment.21
The role of Roger Williams, for whom this law school is named,
must be recognized in creating religious freedom in the United
States. He sided with the Puritans who insisted on a complete
separation with the Anglican Church. But rather than replace the
Anglican Church with a more purified church, Williams advocated
for the complete separation of church and state.22 Exiled from
Massachusetts in 1635, he settled in what is now Providence, Rhode
Island and founded the Rhode Island Colony, which declared in its
charter:
No person within the said colony, at any time hereafter,
shall be any ways molested, punished, disquieted, or called
in question, for any differences in opinion in matters of
religion, and do not actually disturb the peace of our said
colony; but that all and every person and persons may, from
time to time, and at all times hereafter, freely and fully

16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (Establishment Clause); Id. art. VI, cl. 3 (No
Religious Test Clause); see generally id.
17. See HUTSON, supra note 11, at 60.
18. John K. Wilson, Religion Under the State Constitutions, 1776–1800, 32
J. CHURCH & ST. 753, 754 (1990).
19. See id. at 759.
20. See id. at 757.
21. See id. at 758.
22. See id.
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have and enjoy his and their own judgments and
consciences, in matters of religious concernments.23
His goal, as he famously put it in 1643, was to construct “a wall of
Separation between the Garden of the Church and the Wildernes
[sic] of the world.”24
Williams’s work, The Bloudy Tenent25 of Persecution, for Cause
of Conscience, Discussed in a Conference between Truth and Peace,
was published in England in 1644—the same year John Milton
published Areopagitica to make the case for more liberty of
expression (especially for Protestant nonconformists)26—while he
was trying to convince English authorities to grant Rhode Island a
charter.27 The book was so radical that Parliament ordered every
copy burned.28 But it had a substantial influence throughout the
colonies.29 In it he lamented “the blood of so many hundred
thousand souls of protestants and papists, spilt in the Wars of
present and former ages, for their respective Consciences”—noting
that the spilling of this blood “is not required nor accepted by Jesus
Christ the Prince of Peace”—and argued that the “[e]nforced
uniformity” of religion in any “civil state . . . is the greatest occasion
of civil war, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Christ Jesus in
his servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of

23. CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 32, 32-33 (Neil H. Cogan et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015).
24. ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON’S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED,
AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER
WILLIAMS 313, 392 (Rueben Aldridge Guild & James Hammond Trumbull eds.,
1963).
25. “Tenent” is an obsolete spelling of the word “tenet.” See Tenet,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tenet
[perma.cc/33Y9-9AXS] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
26. See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Cambridge U. Press 1916)
(1644).
27. Samuel L. Caldwell, Preface to ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT
OF PERSECUTION (1644), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER
WILLIAMS iii, iii (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1963).
28. See Rob Boston, The Forgotten Founder, CHURCH & ST. MAG. (Apr.
2003), https://www.au.org/church-state/april-2003-church-state/featured/theforgotten-founder [perma.cc/U2PB-UV8Z].
29. See id.
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souls.”30 In the middle of this bloody century, and at the dawn of
the English Civil War, Williams’s advice was that a “firm and
lasting peace” could only be procured by the “permission of other
consciences and worships than a state professes.”31
The Constitution, written in 1787, was in accord with this view.
It makes no mention of religion, let alone a specific religion, as a
basis for governing authority. The first words of the Preamble, “We
the People,” make clear that the sovereign is the people; the
authority of government is derived from it and not from God.32
There is no authority given to Congress to legislate as to matters of
religion.33 In fact, the only explicit mention of religion in the text
of the first seven Articles of the Constitution is a rejection of it as a
basis for holding office.34 Article VI, Section 3 provides:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States
and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office
or public Trust under the United States.35
During this period, debates about state-established or statesupported religions were more controversial, although popular
support for this practice was weakening. At the time of the
Declaration of Independence, Virginia had established a range of
practices in support of Anglicanism, but they were quickly being
erased.36 The legislature repealed laws making it a crime to
subvert Anglicanism and failing to attend church.37 In the 1780s
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—no fans of the “age of
Constantine” that resulted in “millions of innocent men, women,
and children . . . [being] burnt, tortured, fined, and imprisoned”
30. WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 1, 3–4 (spelling modernized).
31. Id. at 4 (spelling modernized).
32. U.S. CONST. pmbl. I explain the importance of “We the People” as the
first words of the Preamble in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 60–64.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I–VII.
35. Id. art. VI, § 3.
36. HOWARD GILLMAN & ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE RELIGION CLAUSES 31
(2020).
37. Id.

2021]

IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION?

411

with no resulting consensus on matters of faith38—engaged in a
lengthy campaign for religious freedom in Virginia.39 Their
campaign ended with the passage of the Virginia Act for Religious
Freedom, the law that disestablished the Anglican Church.40
The controversy in Virginia began in 1784 when Patrick Henry
proposed that a property tax be levied on all citizens to support
ministers of recognized Christian sects, with each property owner
to specify the denomination to which he wished his tax directed.41
An amendment was initially passed to drop the word “Christian” so
that the act would support all religious instruction, but Benjamin
Harrison, the former governor, had the change reversed.42 The
purpose of the bill was to keep the Christian ministry, particularly
the Episcopalian clergy, active and solvent.43
The next year Madison drafted the Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments arguing that the
religion “of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience
of every man” and therefore, “[i]t is the duty of every man to render
to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be
acceptable to him.”44 He went on:
Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to
profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be
of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those
whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has
convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence
against God, not against man . . . .45
In critiquing the proposed law, Madison echoed Locke’s argument
in A Letter Concerning Toleration advocating for a separation of

38. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 167–68 (Lilly &
Wait 1832) (1787).
39. GILLMAN & CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 31.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. THOMAS BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 108
(1977).
43. Id. at 109.
44. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (ca. June 20, 1785), NAT’L. ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 [perma.cc/98YZ-3XR6] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
45. Id.
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civil authority and religious authority:
[T]he Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a
competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ
Religion as an engine of civil policy. The first is an arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers
in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.
....
. . . [The Bill] will destroy that moderation and harmony
which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with
Religion has produced among its several sects. Torrents of
blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of
the secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by
proscribing all difference in Religious opinion. Time has at
length revealed the true remedy. Every relaxation of
narrow and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has
been found to assuage the disease.46
Importantly, Madison was not merely advocating a principle of
“equality” or “no favoritism” among Protestant sects. Rather, he
was urging a more general principle of “noncognizance,” meaning
that the civil authority can take no notice of such matters and
should assert no jurisdiction over a person’s faith and conscience.47
As such, his views presage arguments during debates about the
First Amendment regarding laws that “respect an Establishment of
religion.”48
Virginia politicians waited until the 1786 state election before
finalizing a decision on these debates. The election brought a strong
anti-assessment contingent into the legislature, and the resulting
“Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,” drafted by Jefferson,
disestablished the Anglican Church in Virginia.49 In so doing the
Act declared:
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See Vincent Phillip Munoz, James Madison’s Principle of Religious
Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17, 21–24 (2003).
49. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, H.D. 82, 1779 Gen. Assemb.
(Va. 1786), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082 [perma.cc/JD74-PX8K] (last visited Apr. 6,
2021).
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[T]he impious presumption of legislators and rulers, . . .
who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men,
have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up
their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true
and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on
others, hath established and maintained false religions
over the greatest part of world, and through all time; that
to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical; . . . that our civil rights have no dependence on
our religious opinions, more than our opinions in physics or
geometry; . . . and finally, that truth is great, and will
prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient
antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the
conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her
natural weapons, free argument and debate, errors ceasing
to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict
them.50
The bill was one of the three accomplishments Jefferson insisted be
mentioned on his tombstone, along with authoring the Declaration
of Independence and founding the University of Virginia.51
Christianity obviously was, by far, the dominant religion in the
United States when the Constitution was written, and ever since.52
But the framers made no effort to institutionalize this in the
Constitution. If there is an original meaning to be found concerning
religion and the Constitution, it can be summarized in two
principles. First, the new American republic rejected the centuriesold European practice of linking government authority to a formal
religious tradition or sect. Second, although the government would
have a secular identity, the Constitution also would recognize that

50. Id.
51. Jefferson’s Gravestone, MONTICELLO, https://www.monticello.org/site
/research-and-collections/jeffersons-gravestone [perma.cc/W574-4JAG] (last
visited Apr. 6, 2021).
52. See Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics and Statistics, PEW RES. CTR., https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/
[https://perma.cc/JRG7-TGMK] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021); Mark Hall, Did
America Have a Christian Founding?, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (June 7, 2011),
https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/did-america-have-christianfounding [perma.cc/6X9M-JQJ9].

414 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:404
people would be free to exercise the religion of their choice. Both of
these precepts are flatly inconsistent with the idea that the United
States was meant to be, as a legal matter, a Christian nation. These
two principles came to be embodied in the religion clauses of the
First Amendment, which prohibit any law respecting the
establishment of religion and protect the free exercise of religion.53
II. THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO SEPARATE
CHURCH AND STATE

As a non-originalist, the question is how should the religion
clauses of the First Amendment—the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause—best be interpreted in light of the text of
these provisions, the original understanding, the history of the
United States, precedent, and modern social needs? I am firmly
convinced that these clauses should be interpreted to ensure, to the
greatest extent possible, the separation of church and state.
Government should be secular and should not be identified with
Christianity or any particular religion, or religion over secularism.
Beyond an originalist argument for this conclusion, why should
the Constitution be interpreted in this way? First, this approach
prevents the coercion that is inherent when the government
becomes aligned with religion. World history, to say nothing of the
history of this country, shows us that inherently, when the
government becomes aligned with religion, people feel coerced to
participate.54 As the Court explained in Engel v. Vitale, “the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”55
This is especially the case in the context of public schools.
Certainly, this is why the Supreme Court has repeatedly for almost
a half century held that prayer, even voluntary prayer, does not
belong in public schools.56 Students who are from minority
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. See, e.g., HENRY KAMEN, THE SPANISH INQUISITION: AN HISTORICAL
REVISION 10–11 (1997) (discussing the status of conversos¾Jews or Muslims
who had been forced to convert to Christianity¾and the continuing pressure
to conform in fourteenth-century Spain).
55. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
56. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding that the
Establishment Clause forbids prayer at public school graduations); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (striking down a statute authorizing “moments
of silence” at public schools as violating the Establishment Clause); Abington
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religions, or who have no religious upbringing, feel enormous social
pressure to participate in the prayers of their classmates rather
than risk being ostracized and ridiculed. This was exactly Justice
Kennedy’s point in Lee v. Weisman, when the Court held that clergy
who deliver prayers at public school graduations violate the First
Once the government becomes aligned with
Amendment.57
religion, coercion becomes so easy. We have seen this at public
universities. Cadets at the Air Force Academy talk movingly about
being forced to participate in Christian religious ceremonies, even
if they are not Christians.58 This is the danger if church and state
are not separate. If the United States officially was deemed to be a
Christian country, then those of different faiths inevitably would
feel pressure to conform.
Second, separating church and state—and rejecting that the
United States is a Christian country—is the best way of ensuring
that we can all feel that it is “our” government, whatever our
religion or lack of religion. If government becomes aligned with a
particular religion or religions, or with some overarching religious
traditions (e.g., Christian) over others (Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or
Santiera), those of other beliefs will be made to feel like outsiders,
inherently alienated from the government that claims to represent
us all. Justice O’Connor captured this better than anyone in her
writings for the Court. She said that the Establishment Clause is
there to make sure that none of us are led to feel that we are
insiders or outsiders when it comes to our government.59 She wrote:
“[e]ndorsement [of religion by the government] sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders . . . .”60
If our government becomes aligned with religion or a particular
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (finding that the Establishment Clause barred reading Bible passages in public schools); Engel, 370 U.S.
at 435 (holding that states may not compose official prayer to be read in public
schools).
57. Lee, 505 U.S. at 599.
58. Josh White, Intolerance Found at Air Force Academy, WASH. POST
(June 23, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/22/AR2005062200598_pf.html [perma.cc/3UQ6-895A].
59. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 688.
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religion, some of us are made to feel that we just do not belong in
that place. If there were a large Latin cross atop a city hall, those
who were not part of religions that accept the cross as a religious
symbol would feel that it was not “their” city government. In the
same way, how would one who does not accept God, or one who does
not believe that there is one God, feel about walking into the Texas
Supreme Court or the Texas State Capitol and seeing “I am the
Lord, thy God,” and seeing underneath it, “Thou shalt have no other
gods before me”?61 If we want all citizens to feel that the
government is open for everyone, we need our government to be
strictly secular—respectful of all, without signaling an alliance,
public or secret, with just some.
If the United States ever were to be deemed a Christian
country, such as in a revival of Justice Brewer’s approach, all
members of other religions or those who have no religious beliefs
would feel like outsiders and lesser citizens. That is exactly what
the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to prevent.
A third important reason to favor separation is that it is wrong
to tax people to support the religion of others. James Madison
captured this best in Virginia, where he talked about why he
believed that it was, in his words, “immoral” to tax people to support
religions in which they did not believe.62 Each of us has our own
religion, or maybe we decided that we do not have any religion, but
should our tax dollars go to advance a religion in which we do not
believe? What if it is a religion that teaches things that we find
abhorrent? Certainly, we have the right to give our money to
support any religion or any cause that we want, but it is wrong to
be coerced to give our tax dollars to religions we do not believe in.
That is why separation is best: it allows people to choose how to
spend their money, rather than permitting the government to use
it against their own wishes. This does not deny that there are linedrawing issues with regard to funding, some of which is discussed
below.63 Not providing police and fire protection to houses of
worship would present serious free exercise clause issues. But nor
does that mean that the government paying for everything else—
61. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (upholding a Ten
Commandments monument between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas
Supreme Court).
62. See Madison, supra note 44 (urging the Commonwealth of Virginia not
to enact a bill providing support to religious groups through the levy of a tax).
63. See infra Part III.
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even salaries for clergy—should be permissible.
Finally, keeping the government separate best protects
religion. America is the most religious and religiously diverse
nation in the developed western world, and to a large extent this is
due to the view that people have that the government will play no
favorites, thus allowing all people of faith to worship without fear
or oppression. Roger Williams talked about this prior to the
drafting of the Establishment Clause.64 He wanted to separate
church and state not to safeguard the state from religion, but to
protect religion from the state.65 The reality is that the more the
government becomes involved in religion, the more the government
will regulate religion and, consequently, the greater the danger is
to religion. There is also the danger of trivializing religion. To say
that a cross is just there for secular purposes—as in American
Legion v. American Humanist Association—ignores how important
the cross is as a religious symbol.66
Separation is not hostile to religion.
Of course, any
enforcement of the Establishment Clause will be seen by those who
want a religious presence as hostility to religion. But that view begs
the question and assumes that a religious presence in government
is permissible. If the Constitution is seen as requiring separation
of church and state, excluding religion is enforcing the view that
the place for religion should be in the private realm. Our
government should be secular—for the sake of a less turbulent
political system and for the sake of a diverse set of religious
practitioners seeking a political context where their personal
religious convictions will be respected.
III. “THE TIMES ARE A CHANGIN’”: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RELIGION CLAUSES

There are now likely six justices on the Supreme Court—John
Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett
Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett—who reject the idea of a

64. See JAMES P. BYRD, JR., THE CHALLENGES OF ROGER WILLIAMS 121–27
(2002) (“In the process of corrupting the church, Williams believed that Christendom had corrupted biblical exegesis by devising an interpretative method
that supported the state’s claim to authority over religious matters.”).
65. Id.
66. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019) (upholding the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot cross on public property).
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separation of church and state. They seek to provide much more
protection for religion, including for religious beliefs to be a basis
for violating laws of general applicability.67 I do not foresee their
adopting Justice Brewer’s language that it is a Christian nation,
but I expect that their rulings will consistently achieve the same
results as if they held that explicitly. They will give great latitude
towards Christianity being part of government activities and the
government giving financial support for Christianity. At the same
time, they will allow those who profess a religious objection to gay,
lesbian, and transgender individuals to discriminate; these will
likely be fundamentalist Christians.
First, for these justices, very little will ever violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. To begin with,
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch take the position that the
Establishment Clause does not apply to state and local
governments at all.68 For them, a state could declare Christianity,
or a denomination within it, to be its official religion.69 Justice
Thomas often has expressed the view that the Court was wrong in
finding that the Establishment Clause applies to state and local
governments.70 His view is that the Establishment Clause was
meant to prevent the federal government from establishing
churches that would have competed with existing state churches.71

67. Michelle Boorstein, Religious conservatives hopeful new Supreme
Court majority will redefine religious liberty precedents, WASH. POST. (Nov. 3,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/11/03/supreme-courtreligious-liberty-fulton-catholic-philadelphia-amy-coney-barrettt/
[perma.cc/RM3S-EK7L].
68. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2264 (2020)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice Gorsuch joining); see James R. Rogers, Incorporating the Establishment Clause, Wrongly, LAW LIBERTY (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://lawliberty.org/incorporating-the-establishment-clause-wrongly/
[perma.cc/A2G6-VRWV].
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 604–08 (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas,
J., concurring); see also Richard F. Duncan, Justice Thomas and Partial Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: Herein of Structural Limitations, Liberty
Interests, and Taking Incorporation Seriously, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 39, 44–45
(2007).
71. See Galloway, 572 U.S. at 604–06; see also Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50–
51; Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 678-79.
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This view, of course, would mean a dramatic change in the law as
state and local governments would be completely unconstrained by
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In his most recent expression of this, in 2020, in Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue, Justice Thomas was joined by
Justice Gorsuch in declaring: “This understanding of the
Establishment Clause is unmoored from the original meaning of the
First Amendment. As I have explained in previous cases, at the
founding, the Clause served only to ‘protec[t] States, and by
extension their citizens, from the imposition of an established
religion by the Federal Government.’”72 But then Justice Thomas
went even further in expressing the view that the government may
embrace a particular religion: “Thus, the modern view, which
presumes that States must remain both completely separate from
and virtually silent on matters of religion to comply with the
Establishment Clause, is fundamentally incorrect.
Properly
understood, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit States
from favoring religion.”73 Under this view, nothing a state or local
government could do—including deeming itself to be a Christian
city or state—would offend the Establishment Clause.
In 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education, the Court
unanimously held that the Establishment Clause applies to state
and local governments.74 Not one justice questioned this until
Clarence Thomas. Now Neil Gorsuch has joined this view, and it is
possible that Justice Amy Coney Barrett—both a self-avowed
originalist and very conservative—could be a third vote.75
But even for the conservative justices who do not go this far,
they find little violates the Establishment Clause. They believe
that the Establishment Clause—the provision of the First
Amendment prohibiting any law respecting the establishment of
religion—should be interpreted to accommodate religious
72. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 678) (emphasis Espinoza).
73. Id. at 2264.
74. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1947) (the Court split five–
four on whether the buses to take children to and from school violated the Establishment Clause in favor of constitutionality).
75. Tom McCarthy, Amy Coney Barrett is a constitutional ‘originalist’ – but
what does it mean?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/26/amy-coney-barrett-originalist-but-what-does-itmean [perma.cc/XN97-8ACR].
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participation in government and government support for religious
institutions.76 Under their view, the government violates the
Establishment Clause only if it coerces religious participation or
discriminates among religions in the provision of benefits.77 Under
this approach, the Establishment Clause is not violated by religious
symbols on government property,78 or by religious observances at
government functions,79 or by the government providing financial
support to religious institutions even when it is used for religious
indoctrination.80
The ability of the government to favor Christianity over all
other religions under their view is reflected in two recent Supreme
Court decisions. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court held that
it does not violate the Establishment Clause for a town board to
begin virtually every meeting over a ten-year period with a prayer
by a Christian minister.81 The Town of Greece is a suburb of
Rochester, New York of about 100,000 people.82 Its town board
opened meetings with a moment of silence until 1999 when the
town supervisors initiated a policy change.83 The town began
inviting ministers to begin meetings each month with a prayer.84
From 1999 to 2007, the town invited exclusively Christian
ministers, most of whom gave explicitly Christian prayers.85

76. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment, of course, says that
“Congress” may not do this. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court held
that the Establishment Clause applies to state and local governments through
its incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
330 U.S. 1 (1947). It always has been assumed that the First Amendment
applies to the President and to the federal courts, even though its text provides
only a prohibition against “Congress.”
77. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014).
78. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct 2067, 2090 (2019)
(upholding thirty-two-foot cross on government property).
79. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86 (upholding Christian prayers
before Town Board meetings over a long period of time).
80. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (opinion
by Justice Thomas holding that the government may provide aid to parochial
schools even if it is used for religious instruction).
81. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86.
82. Id. at 570.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 571.
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In 2007, complaints were made to the Town Board about this
and for four months clergy from other religions were invited.86 But
then for the next eighteen months, the Town Board reverted to
inviting only Christian clergy and their prayers were almost always
Christian in their content.87
The Court, in a five–four decision, held that the Town of Greece
did not violate the Establishment Clause.88 The Court stressed the
long history of prayers before legislative sessions, including
explicitly Christian prayers, and said that its precedent “teaches
. . . that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference
to historical practices and understandings.’”89 The Court said that
for it to require nonsectarian prayers would put the government
and the courts unduly in the position of monitoring the content of
the prayers delivered by others:
To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force
the legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts that
are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors and
censors of religious speech, a rule that would involve
government in religious matters to a far greater degree
than is the case under the town’s current practice of neither
editing or approving prayers in advance nor criticizing
their content after the fact.90
The Court expressed great deference to the government in
having prayers before legislative sessions and held: “[a]bsent a
pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray
an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on
the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional
violation.”91
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, which was joined in part by Justice
Scalia.92 Writing for just himself, Justice Thomas reiterated his
86. Id. at 572.
87. Id. at 611–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 565, 568 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
90. Id. at 566.
91. Id. at 585.
92. Id. at 568.
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view, described above, that the Establishment Clause does not
apply to state and local governments.93 In a part of the opinion
joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that the
Establishment Clause is violated only if there is “actual legal
coercion” to participate in religious activities.94
Justice Kagan wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.95 The dissent found that the
Town Board violated the Establishment Clause by inviting
virtually only Christian clergy over a long period of time and their
usually delivering explicitly Christian prayers.96 Justice Kagan
wrote: “the Town of Greece’s prayer practices violate that norm of
religious equality—the breathtakingly generous constitutional idea
that our public institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu
than to the Methodist or Episcopalian.”97 Justice Kagan explicitly
distinguished Marsh v. Chambers, which had allowed clergydelivered prayers before congressional sessions:
The practice at issue here differs from the one sustained in
Marsh because Greece’s town meetings involve
participation by ordinary citizens, and the invocations
given—directly to those citizens—were predominantly
sectarian in content. Still more, Greece’s Board did
nothing to recognize religious diversity: In arranging for
clergy members to open each meeting, the Town never
sought (except briefly when this suit was filed) to involve,
accommodate, or in any way reach out to adherents of nonChristian religions. So month in and month out for over a
93. Id. at 608 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 592.
94. Id. at 608 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95. Id. at 615 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion and stated:
[T]he town of Greece failed to make reasonable efforts to include
prayer givers of minority faiths, with the result that, although it is a
community of several faiths, its prayer givers were almost exclusively
persons of a single faith. Under these circumstances, I would affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals that Greece’s prayer practice
violated the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 631 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 615–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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decade, prayers steeped in only one faith, addressed toward
members of the public, commenced meetings to discuss
local affairs and distribute government benefits. In my
view, that practice does not square with the First
Amendment’s promise that every citizen, irrespective of
her religion, owns an equal share in her government.98
The practical effect of Town of Greece v. Galloway is that there
will be Christian prayers before legislative sessions in many parts of
the country. A subsequent case makes clear that the Court will allow
Christian religious symbols on government property. In American
Legion v. American Humanist Association, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot cross that sits on public
property in Prince George’s County, Maryland.99 The cross was
erected in 1920 as a memorial to those who died in military service
in World War I.100
The Court in a seven–two decision rejected the constitutional
challenge.101 Justice Alito wrote, in part for the majority and in
part for a plurality, and stressed that although a cross is a religious
symbol, it also has other non-religious significance, including as a
memorial for war dead.102 He explained:
The cross came into widespread use as a symbol of
Christianity by the fourth century, and it retains that
meaning today. But there are many contexts in which the
symbol has also taken on a secular meaning. Indeed, there
are instances in which its message is now almost entirely
secular.103
Justice Alito stressed that the monument long had been
present and to remove it would be hostility to religion.104 Justice
Alito declared: “[t]he passage of time gives rise to a strong
presumption of constitutionality.”105

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 616.
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2068 (2019).
Id.
Id. at 2067.
Id. at 2069–70.
Id. at 2074 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2084–85.
Id. at 2085.
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Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment and argued that no
one has standing to challenge a religious symbol on government
property on the basis of “‘offended observer’ theory”.106 He said that
no one is sufficiently injured to permit a suit in federal court.107 He
concluded that “suits like this one should be dismissed for lack of
standing.”108 This, of course, would mean that the government can
put any religious symbol it wants on any piece of government
property and no federal court could stop it because, under Justice
Gorsuch’s view, no one ever would have standing to challenge this.
Justice Kavanaugh concurred and wrote separately to say that
he believed that the Court had largely overruled the test from
Lemon v. Kurtzman, a position long taken by those who advocate
the accommodationist approach to the Establishment Clause.109
He made clear that religious symbols on government property do
not offend the Constitution: “[t]he practice of displaying religious
memorials, particularly religious war memorials, on public land is
not coercive and is rooted in history and tradition.”110
Only Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented.111 Justice
Ginsburg expressed the view that a cross is the quintessential
Christian religious symbol and the display of a thirty-two-foot cross
on public property violates the Establishment Clause.112 She
wrote:
By maintaining the Peace Cross on a public highway, the
Commission elevates Christianity over other faiths, and
religion over nonreligion. Memorializing the service of
American soldiers is an “admirable and unquestionably
secular” objective. But the Commission does not serve that
objective by displaying a symbol that bears “a starkly
sectarian message.”113

106. Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2103 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2104.
113. Id. (first quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 715 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); and then quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 736
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
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From this case, and other recent decisions such as Town of
Greece v. Galloway, it seems that there are now five justices—
Roberts, Thomas (who does not believe that the Establishment
Clause applies to the states at all), Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh—to take the approach that the government violates the
Establishment Clause only when it coerces religious participation
or discriminates among religions in the distribution of benefits.114
Rarely will the government be deemed to infringe this part of the
First Amendment. I have no doubt Justice Barrett will join them.
In other words, there is a majority to allow the government to be
aligned with Christianity, even without a declaration that the
United States is officially a Christian nation.
Second, there is a majority on the Court to grant broad
exemptions to general laws—such as those requiring employers to
provide contraceptives or forbidding discrimination based on sexual
orientation—based on religious beliefs. Also, this is a majority that
is requiring the government to provide aid to religion when it
provides it to secular institutions. Two cases from June 2020 are
revealing.
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue involved a
Montana law that allowed parents sending their children to private
school to receive a $150 tax credit.115 In Montana, most private
schools are religious.116 The Montana Supreme Court had
invalidated the tax credit law as violating the Montana State
Constitution, which forbids direct or indirect government aid to
religion.117
That should have ended the matter. The Montana tax credit
program no longer existed; it could not be said that Montana was
discriminating against religious institutions. This was Justice
Ginsburg’s key point in dissent: the Montana Supreme Court’s
decision invalidated the entire tax credit program, so that no one
receives any money for private schools, whether secular or

114. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591 (2014).
115. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).
116. Nina Totenberg & Brian Naylor, Supreme Court: Montana Can’t Exclude Religious Schools From Scholarship Program, NPR (June 30, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/30/883074890/supreme-court-montana-cant-exclude-religious-schools-from-scholarship-program [perma.cc/QLU8-XM9Y].
117. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2253.
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religious.118 Therefore, Justice Ginsburg contended, no one is being
treated differently based on religion, and there is no constitutional
problem.119
But the Supreme Court, five–four, concluded that the Montana
Supreme Court violated free exercise of religion by invalidating the
tuition program.120 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the
Court and said that the Montana Constitution prevented parents
from receiving aid if they sent their children to religious as opposed
to secular private schools.121 This, the Court concluded, violated
free exercise of religion.122 The Court said that the government
must have a compelling reason and no other alternative any time it
denies benefits to religious institutions that it allows to secular
ones.123
Three years earlier, in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, the Court held that the State of Missouri violated the
Free Exercise Clause when it gave secular private schools aid for
playgrounds but denied the assistance to religious schools.124 The
Court said it was “odious” to deny religious institutions benefits
that go to secular ones and that strict scrutiny had to be met,125 but
in a footnote the Court apparently cabined its holding to the facts
before it (specifically, aid for “playground resurfacing”).126 Now the
Court has made it clear that whenever the government gives
benefits to secular private schools it must provide them to religious
schools unless it can be shown that doing so would violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. And as explained
above, very little will violate the Establishment Clause for the
conservative justices on the Court.
Prior to 2017, the Court had looked askance at challengers
seeking to compel state governments to provide aid to religion

118. Id. at 2280–81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2262–63 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 2254.
122. Id. at 2262–63.
123. See id. at 2260–61.
124. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2024 (2017).
125. Id. at 2025.
126. Id. at 2023 n.3.
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under the guise of the Free Exercise Clause.127 Now a majority on
the Court has found that the government is compelled to do so
whenever it gives assistance to secular private institutions.128
When President George W. Bush took office, he created an office of
faith-based programs to facilitate churches, synagogues, and
mosques receiving federal social service money.129 There was a
debate among scholars and litigation in the courts as to whether
the government may give this aid to religion or whether it violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.130 But now the
Supreme Court has held that Constitution requires the government
to provide aid to religious institutions when it provides benefits to
secular ones.131 In a country where Christians are the largest
religious group, there is no doubt that Christian denominations and
their schools will be the primary beneficiaries.
In addition to using the Free Exercise Clause as an
unprecedented cudgel against state “no aid” (disestablishment)
provisions, the conservatives have also deviated from long-standing
precedent to use religious liberty to allow individuals to use their
religion to impose great harm on others. In 1990, in Employment
Division v. Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be used to challenge neutral laws of general applicability,
no matter how much they burden religion, unless it can be shown
that the government’s action is based on animus to religion.132 But
the current Court has backed away from this approach and
supports a much more robust protection of free exercise of religion.

127. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that state
scholarship program for postsecondary education denying use of funds for theological training did not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause).
128. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020).
129. Frank Bruni & Laurie Goodstein, New Bush Office Seeks Closer Ties
To Church, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/29/
us/new-bush-office-seeks-closer-ties-to-church-groups.html [perma.cc/83AB546R].
130. See generally Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587
(2007); Martha A. Boden, Compassion Inaction: Why President Bush’s FaithBased Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 991
(2006); Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of
Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183 (2002).
131. See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261.
132. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
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For instance, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. MorrisseyBerru, the Court ruled that elementary school teachers at a
Catholic school could not sue for employment discrimination.133
The two cases before the Court involved a teacher who sued for
disability discrimination after losing her job following a diagnosis
for breast cancer and a teacher who sued for age discrimination
after being replaced by a younger instructor.134
Previously, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, the Court had only acknowledged a narrow
exception that protected religions from being held liable for choices
made with respect to “ministers,” because decisions regarding such
officers necessarily implicate ecclesiastical questions that the
government should not second guess.135 But now the Court has
expanded it to all teachers, meaning that religious schools can
discriminate with impunity based on race, sex, religion, sexual
orientation, age, and disability.136 Again, overwhelmingly it is
likely to be Christian schools, especially Catholic and evangelical
Christian schools, that take advantage of this exemption from
employment discrimination laws.
The Free Exercise Clause is being used to undermine rights to
nondiscriminatory treatment that people are entitled to in all other
settings. Ironically, the same conservative justices who, in
Espinoza, stressed that religious schools should be treated the same
as secular ones, in Our Lady of Guadalupe said that they should be
treated differently with a broad exemption from antidiscrimination laws.137
In this way, the Court will act as if it were a Christian nation,
even without so holding. And in the 2020 October Term, the Court
133. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066
(2020).
134. Id. at 2056–60.
135. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012).
136. See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2069.
137. Compare id. at 2069 (“When a school with a religious mission entrusts
a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the
faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the school and teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment does not
allow.”), with Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261 (“A state need not subsidize private
education. But once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private
schools solely because they are religious.”).
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has a case before it where it likely will expand religious exemptions
from general laws, and perhaps even overrule Smith.138
CONCLUSION

Governments in the United States, to the greatest extent
possible, should be secular. Legally, the government should not be
allowed to align with Christianity or any other religion. Yet, I
worry that the Supreme Court is moving very much in the opposite
direction, effectively allowing the United States to be a Christian
nation. As I watch this process unfold, I am reminded of the words
of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who said:
By enforcing the [Religion] Clauses, we have kept religion
a matter for the individual conscience, not for the
prosecutor or bureaucrat. At a time when we see around
the world the violent consequences of the assumption of
religious authority by government, Americans may count
themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional
boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while
allowing private religious exercise to flourish. . . . Those
who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and
state must therefore answer a difficult question: Why
would we trade a system that has served us so well for one
that has served others so poorly?139

138. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140
S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123).
139. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (internal citations omitted).

